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To judge, in Latin ju-dicare, is to say the law, jus dicere,
whence juris-dictio.
The above sentence is a possible answer to the question: what
is judging? It spells out what the word "to judge" says, by recalling
the history from which the word originates. Why would anyone ask
this question? How helpful is such an answer?
Everyone knows what it is to judge. Only on the ground of
such self-evidence could there be that unabating debate on the
' justification" of particular judgments, which is the day to day business of lawyering. Only because the question can be passed over can
there be controversy regarding "the forms and limits" of adjudication
in general, a preoccupation without which jurisprudence would seem
to lose its main occupation. Why ask the question? Precisely because
the matter is self-evident.
As soon as we examine it a little, confusion begins to set in all
over. Monsieur Jourdain likely would be flattered if he knew that
logicians employ the word 'Judgment" in its widest sense to designate
propositions of all kinds: He has been judging all along, and therefore
knows already how to do it. Even Kant follows this usage when he
says that "we can reduce all acts of the understanding to judgments,"
and goes on to propose a "table" that classifies all possible forms of
judment into four groups of three (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, * A 6770, B 92-95; normally, English translations refer to corresponding
•
Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. Docteur en Droit, Universit6 de
Liege, Belgium, 1961; Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1966. An earlier version of this
Essay was read at a conference on adjudication at the Centre de Philosophie du Droit,
Universit6 Catholique de Louvain, in December 1990. I thank Professor Jacques Lenoble,
Directeur of the Centre, for giving me that opportunity.
References in the text are not to be treated as indicating sources, evidence, authority, or
support of some kind for a point made in the text of the Essay. Rather they point the reader to
materials to be read along with the main text of the Essay, as though they belonged in it.
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pages of the same star editions). Could it be that almost all speaking
is a saying of law?
A little later in the same treatise, however, Kant restricts the
sense of 'Judgment" to the act of "subsuming under rules, that is, of
distinguishing whether something falls under a given rule or not
(casus datae legis)" (id. A 132-34, B 171-74). This sense is borrowed
from lawyerly usage, not from logic, for, as Kant shows, logic has
nothing to say regarding this operation. There are, and there can be,
no rules regarding the application of rules. If Kant is right, a sizable
part of what we take to be "law," and almost all jurisprudence, are
nothing but a futile striving to overcome this essential unruliness of
judgment. How can it be that the saying of law is lawless?
Perhaps, however, even to lawyers, the essence of a judgment
does not lie in the application of a rule to a particular case, but rather
in the statement, or restatement, of the rule to be applied. If law
consists of rules, and if rules themselves are general propositions
stating obligations in general terms, then the properly 'judicial" in a
judgment would be the stating of rules. The "case" would then matter
only as providing an occasion for such a ruling. If so, 'Judging,"jurisdictio, would find its most manifest instantiation in what we call
"legislation," legis-latio, from legem tollere, the elevation of a lex, or
statute, to its position of authority, which is always at once also the
corresponding degradation of another.
Kant too, perhaps following this unmistakable hint of language, found a kind of judgment in which the casus itself was manifestly decided, indeed incontrovertibly, although the rule under which
the fallen case fell was still to be found, and would eventually deny
itself entirely to man's power to say. To this type of judgment, he
devoted the most heroic of his works, which he called a critique of the
power of judgment, Kritik der Urteilskraft. There the will to judge
seems to run up against its outer limits. In what sense indeed is
there still a 'Judgment," that is, a saying of law, when the supposed
"law" withdraws into ineffability?
Had we listened to the history of the word, briefly told at the
outset, this last difficulty would not have come as a surprise. We
rather should have been prompted right away to question whether the
saying of law could ever consist in the statement of general propositions of the kind to which we are accustomed by both logic and common practice. The word 'Judge," in French juge, conceals its base
origins in the contraction by vulgar usage of two Latin words, ius
dicare, the special resonance of which had by then long ago ceased to
be heard. Once upon a time, these Latin words would have inspired
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the piety with which the Ancients honored their gods. For ius, like
the Greek Elg, signifies the good above all in the sense of what
belongs in overabundance to the gods themselves, and so constitutes
their utter greatness and blessedness. Said of what we translate as
"law," it signifies that this law belongs to the domain of the holy. Of
such a law, there can be no saying in the common language of day to
day business, no plain dicere, but only a proper dicare, in the sense of
which we still hear an echo in the word "dedication," the solemn
saying by which something is devoted to the gods. Then indeed the
true does withdraw into the ineffable. In forgetting this history, have
we perhaps also lost knowledge of what it is properly to say the law?
Let us then pose the question anew. In our own still recent
past, the last thinker who attempted to ask it in earnest was Martin
Heidegger. He gave the law, das Gesetz, a simple, mysterious, and
untranslatable name: das Ereignis. Suffice it to say, for now, that
the word evokes a more nearly intelligible thought, namely das
Eigene, what is one's own. "DasEreignis ist das Gesetz, insofern es
die Sterblichen zu ihrem Wesen versammelt und darin hdlt, Ereignis
is the law, insofar as it gathers the mortals into their essence, and
holds them therein" (Unterwegs zur Sprache, hereafter "UZS", 259
(Neske, 1959) hereafter "UZS", translated in Peter D. Herz, On the
Way to Language, hereafter Eng., 128-29 (Harper & Row, 1971)).t
Accordingly, to say the law is to recall man to his own most essential
possibility. Thinking may prepare us to listen for such a call: it sets
us on the way, unterwegs, to our destiny.
The following notes seek to remember the thinker's teaching.
The task is to listen to what he said, and then to draw out of our own
language words that may faithfully repeat it. Modest as the effort
may be, it requires such a straining of our powers that from its beginning it is destined to fail. Nevertheless, its very shortcomings may
show us how to take a few steps on our own way. The texts to be
studied appear at first to be few and scattered, so much so that current opinion holds Heidegger never to have paid serious attention to
anything like law, or "ethics." Attentive reading, however, would soon
reveal that the thinker never asks any question other than that regarding the essence and destiny, i.e., the law of mankind. This quest
Page references to the published English translations of cited works are provided in
the event that the reader may find them helpful in opening access to the original German text.
By themselves, with very few exceptions, extant translations are not reliable. They cannot be, if
only because of Heidegger's manner of writing, which depends much upon the poetic play of the
German language. The translations offered in this Essay are the Author's own, and suffer from
the same incompetence.
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tion is far deeper and more decisive than anything any specialized
subdiscipline in philosophy could ever hope to reach, if indeed thinking is divisible at all in such "scholarly" ways. To read Heidegger is to
follow him in his ever renewed attempts to ask our question, and that
is: to let ourselves be struck by that of and about which it asks, die
Sache selbst, the thing-sought itself. Die Sache here is: the saying of
law. What is "law ? What is it to "say"? How may the law be said, if
indeed there can be a saying of law?
I. NOMOS
What is law? In turning to our first question, we may find it
helpful to approach Heidegger from out of a domain that may be more
nearly accessible. We take our departure from an ancient, yet still
audible intimation: that the essence of law may be found in the essence of friendship. Our guide on our first steps is Aristotle, whose
treatise on friendship in Books VIII and IX of the Nicomachean
Ethics, remains the single most indispensable source of insight into
this matter.
There opens before us a possible way together as we wander
upon this earth. We see it. We understand it. We call it our friendship. It calls us on the way to be friends. This call of friendship, that
we be friends, is our "law" in the original sense of the old English
word lagu, in German die Lage: what lies ahead of us, the possibility
of a possible way for us to follow together.
What is the way of friendship? What first opens it to us?
What moves us to take it, if and when it opens? Aristotle begins his
treatise on friendship with the remark that it is of the highest necessity for the fulfillment of a human life, &vayiLcarat6
ov Stg 'rov P ov
(NicomacheanEthics, hereafter NE, VIII, i, 1, 1155 a 5). What is the
source of this necessity? How does it necessitate what it makes necessary?
Aristotle returns to the question of necessity near the end of
his treatise where he explains how friendship, as the sharing of words
and thoughts, To" icocovdv ko'6yov KaL 8Lavotag, is the mode of living
together, -io autfjv, das Mit-sein, that properly belongs to man, as
distinguished from cattle, whose living together consists in grazing on
the same pasture, TO"6v T45 au'Tai V8otga00aL (NE, IX, ix, 10, 1170 b 10).
Aristotle conceives life as a mode of being: to live, he says, is for the
living what it is to be, To' 61 tfjV -Urog tCOL TO S V L F.otLv (De Anima, II,
iv, 415 b 14). Man too lives, but he stands apart from all other living
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beings as the only one endowed with speech, X6 yov 8 [io'vo Vopwoxog
9X8L -rtdv diwv (Politics,I, i, 10, 1253 a 10). Hence, for man to be is not
merely to live, but to feel, and to think, atcd0a&vEoOaL 1 vostv (NE, IX,
ix, 7-10, 1170 a 15-1170 b 19). Such is the way the good man is, and
his own being is to him good in itself, KaO'abTo ayaO8v, that for which
he reaches and cares the most, [L&%LcrTa alperbv, that without which
he would fall in need, 9v8sig AaraL (id.). Thus, both the essence of

friendship-the sharing of words and thoughts-and its necessity are
determined from out of the essence and the necessity of man's being
as the being who speaks and for whom to be is to feel and to think.
The need that moves the reaching for friendship is the same as the
need that moves a man's reaching for his own being. To friends it is
necessary that they rejoice in feeling together that the friend is, i.e.,
feels and thinks, ouvaLO

oO&avscZL
6pa 8L Kal -a

(poLXov &L 9o-vV (id.).

The law of friendship requires nothing other than that the friends be
who they are, feeling and thinking, in accordance with every man's
own essential possibility. Hence, friendship is not only necessary, but
also noble and beautiful, ou [t6 vov 8' &vaLyat6 v oTv &Xk&icca Ka 6 v
(NE,VIII, i, 5, 1155 a 29). Unlike the lower necessities that condition
life, this necessity calls as the gentle invitation of a great destiny.
Friends, as the word itself says in English and German alike, are
those who let themselves and each other be free, frei, freiend, to be
who they are.
A modern reader may be tempted to read this text as though it
foreshadowed a Cartesian grounding of law in the will of the I as the
self-thinking subject. Indeed the passage contains words that might
sound like Aristotle's cogito me cogitare, cogito, sum: 6' p6iv &L 6 p4
a'uTveTaL Kal 0 aLKoVCOV
oxL aKouSL
tat~L
,&l a8ftcov
11 '66 Pa8t, Kal &L
aXrcov O'LOLO)
SO L TL TO aoO0avo01Lvov 6 TL 'vEpyoi4Lsv,
aktavEoisu, O",t atOavo'g~a, K'\v vocogev, O-CL VOoCLSV,

ots 5av
TO 8' &L

a6cOavoLsOa 'voofVOpSOtso~v
sv, 8 '
' (t , y~p ~vaL v aToaveoOQL 3
vorv), he who sees feels that he sees, and he who hears, that he
hears, and who walks, that he walks, and with all other doings there
is the feeling that we are at work, so that if we feel, [we feel] that we
feel, and if we think, [we feel] that we think, and the [feeling] that we
feel or think is the [feeling] that we are (for to be is to feel and to
think) (NE, IX, ix, 9, 1170 a 30-35). Of course the Greeks knew the
fact of apperception. Their language excelled in the middle voice, but
the thought of man as the self-grounding subject and ground of all
being was utterly alien to them. In this passage of Aristotle's treatise,
apperception comes into play at two levels. First, it is itself an
instance of the being-at-work, Ivwpyda, of the power, "vatug, to feel
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and to think, the being-at-work of which it apprehends; there
precisely, in the being-at-work of his distinctive endowment, is man
c1puog, most properly himself (NE, IX, ix, 7, 1170 a 15-20). Second,
apperception is that through which his own being, hence also the
friend's own being, his other self, show themselves in their goodness,
thereby enabling him to grasp their necessity.
Who then are men, to be so destined by law to the freedom of
friendship? Men are the mortals, beings to whom it has been given at
birth to understand, namely to see beings in the light in which they
come to shine, that is, to be. Understanding itself is that light, under
which man stands. At some risk, the word "understanding" is here
taken in the old and wide sense it still has in English, and shares
with the Greek voiv, and the German verstehen and unterstehen. By
no means is it intended in the restricted senses of theoretical
cognition, or conceptual apprehension, or of some psychological
faculty of knowing. Nor does it refer to any actual body of knowledge
or belief. Like law, and friendship, understanding always lies ahead
of man as the opening of his possibility.
Man feels, thinks, speaks, and shares with man in feeling and
thinking. These are not merely some activities he may or may not
undertake, tasks that he can set out to perform when he chooses and
as he decides. Whatever man does, he does understandingly, by way
of feeling, thinking, and speaking. As man's way of being, feeling,
thought, speech, and sharing with man are at bottom not of man's
own doing. They do not occur at the command of his will, they never
let their play be determined by the rules and programs he sets up.
Man is given to understand, but understanding does not belong
among his possessions. Rather, man himself belongs to, and is possessed by it. The law calls man to his own essential destiny, but the
essence of man is nothing human at all.
The gift of understanding is the opening of the time-and-space
within which beings come to presence before man. This openness is
the world as the primordial binding of the relation of man to being.
The world is "the tree of graces" (UZS 23; this phrase and the essay
from which it is taken are omitted in the English translation; they
may be found in Albert Hofstadter, transl., Poetry, Language, Thought
187, 201 (Harper & Row, 1971)). As the light in which all beings appear, the openness of the world encompasses them all and "is" itself,
strictly speaking, no-thing. It surrounds man as that in and under
which he "always already" stands and understands, and which always
precedes him in every direction he turns. "Welt ist das immer
Ungegenstindliche, dem wir unterstehen, solange die Bahnen von
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Geburt und Tod, Segen und Fluch uns in das Sein entridckt halten.
World is what never stands against and before us, but under which
we always stand, as long as the paths of birth and death, of blessing
and curse hold us transported in being" (Der Ursprung des
Kunstwerkes, in Holzwege, hereafter "UKW", 33 (Klostermann, 1950),
translated in Poetry,Language, Thought, hereafter Eng., 44). As this
all-encompassing, always already shining illumination, as the nothing
out of which man can never step, the law of understanding eludes
every striving of man to grasp it, to hold it before his eyes, to
measure, and to master it. We may here recall Plato's word that the
law, as the W8a
ao
&ya0o,
'
reigns &L ss'KeLva -'g ou'aoag xpeapsta
KCL%UV&ILEL IMSpEX4w, far above and beyond all beings in rank and
power (Republic, VI, 509 b 9). Of course the thought of a gift of
understanding invites the question of the source of this gift, but this
question must not be heard as asking for some kind of being from or
by which the gift would have been handed over to man. The essence
of a gift originates in its being given. For us who are given the gift of
understanding, the question of its origin is properly thought only in
the thinking that thanks (Was heil3t Denken?, hereafter "W ID", 91-95
(Niemeyer, 1954), translated in Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray,
What Is Called Thinking?, hereafter Eng., 138-47 (Harper & Row,
1968)).
In understanding, beings of all sorts appear out of hiddenness
into the open, and show themselves as they are. In the openness of
understanding, each being is allowed its own place, and all traits and
relations that belong to it as its own, its properties. Understanding
frees: it releases beings out of concealment in the truth of appearance. Understanding allows, in both original senses of ad-locare and
ad-laudare: it grants all beings their place in the totality of being,
and it celebrates them as they show themselves in their traits and
relations. Understanding gives each being the possibility of its being.
In that it allows beings to be, understanding is law in the sense of the
Greek votog, that by virtue of which all viJLsL, all assigning,
allotting, dispensing, can occur. Aristotle recalls that law when, in
the treatise on friendship, he introduces the supreme principle that
orders all relations among men, and indeed between men and the
gods: S&a"ULg Ta oLcSta movegtinreov (NE, IX, ii, 7, 1165 a 17), suum
cuique tribuere, allow to each their own. Perhaps already then the
phrase had become a cich6. More than two thousand years passed
before it was at last heard to say what in truth it says, namely the
principle of truth itself. In Heidegger's words: ']egliches in seinem
Eigenen anwesen, in sein Geh6rigesgeh6ren lassen, to let every [being]
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be present in [what is] its own, [to let every being] belong with what
belongs to it" (UZS 259, Eng. 128).
In a translation of Antigone's appeal to the law of the gods,
Heidegger renders 6 voLog as der weisende Brauch (UZS 219, Eng.
140; compare Uber den Humanismus, hereafter "Bii1', 51
(Klostermann, 1949), translated in David Farrell Krell, ed., Martin
Heidegger: Basic Writings, hereafter Eng., 238 (Harper, 1977) and
Erlduterungenzu HdlderlinsDichtung 167 (Klostermann, 1971)). The
phrase defies translation, but in view of Heidegger's explanation of
the relevant sense of brauchen (WHD 114-15, Eng. 186-89), a
paraphrase can perhaps be ventured. The law, as v Lot, is the need
that calls man and points him the way to, and so frees him for, his
own essential possibility, which is to allow all beings what is their
own. The law itself calls and allows man to his place, der Ort, the da
of Da-sein and Mit-da-sein, the place of the being who is given to
understand. The reigning of the law of understanding is called in
Greek 5("I, from the verb 851c*ViKiL, to show, to let see and be seen,

whence also dicere and dicare, to say. This is the Greek word we
commonly render in Latin as justitia, 'justice," whereas it signifies
the original showing or assignment by virtue of which every being is
to be the being that it is.
The law of friendship is the law of understanding. We are
friends in that we understand each other, and so free and allow each
other to be who we are, namely the mortals to whom it is given to
understand. Aristotle spells it out. Each of us wishes the good for
himself, for his own sake, that is, for the sake of understanding,
86 tauT~q- Taya8 ",
'iainoz
which is his way to be: ical Po1s-ai
yap 8Lavoi irTKo x&pLV, dirsp sKaOTOg itvaL 8oics (NE, IX, iv,
Mi~ca, 3, 1166 a 15). Understanding, as the mode of being proper to man, is
the good in itself that determines the 'csXog,the end of man, in the
sense of his completion. Now each of us wishes the same good for his
friend as he wishes for himself, since a friend is another self, whose
& Tov q(pXov 'X'XsLv (OP
5pg
mode of being is the same as our own:
oTL Ya-p 6 CPLXoc hblog arurTg (NE, IX, iv, 5, 1166 a 30).
apog Ew-6v
Accordingly we think kindly of each other, as we do of ourselves, with
gentleness, ysvvacog , that is, in accordance with our noble birth. But
this kindness, which Aristotle calls Cu"vota, well-mindedness, lays only
the principle, apx'j, of our friendship. Each of us might well
separately harbor kind thoughts for the other, without our ever
coming to share in the sight of our possible closeness. For friendship
to bloom, our well-mindedness itself must disclose itself before us, Ruj
xavoavovaa, in the truth of unconcealment (NE, VIII, ii, 3-4, 1155 b
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30-35). It comes to appearance in the work, to 'pyov, das Werk, of our
joining in action, oupIaprp-tv. Thus, in time, as we dwell together,
kindness becomes friendship, XpoVLolAvv
Kc& s
a OBLav
&(pLKvor.uYILV1v ytvWoClL (LXpLCv (NE, IX, v, 3, 1167 a 10-15). Time and
dwelling are not here thought of as conditions external to friendship,
as though the latter issued from the former like the effect of some
conducive circumstances. Rather time and dwelling constitute the
open in which A)vo~a first shows itself in the shining splendor of its
work, &av tp cav j Kak 6 ; ig TEL-OL0:Yo V (NE, IX, v, 4, 1167 a 20),
and thus rises to 9vpys(a, the being-at-work of being proper. Only
there can our friendly understanding come into the light of understanding, because time and dwelling are the time and space of the
play of appearance, that is, the open of truth and understanding itself. As understanding, as the oVwwaL of the beings who feel and
think, friendship is Xpowogsvl oU V10CLa, temporal dwelling

together, i.e., the sharing of a historical world.
With this recognition of mutual understanding, the unity of
friendship is sealed. Out of the shining of their SVVOLCa in Xpovtotisvl
ovvq~ea, friends form the o'ovo a, the same-mindedness, in and
through which they know themselves as the same in their difference,
in such a way that each is to the other like another self, %Xkogaimoxg.
There is S6 voLa when friends know the same regarding what brings
them together, and prefer the same, and act upon what they see they
have in common, Sav aepl -wv ru psp6vr
ov'
'
' '
poatpio)waL ica 7LPa'Tt(oaLa Jowt 8O"avra (NE, IX, vi, 1, 1167 a 2530). Such harmony reigns Fv tog enoLK&Tw, among men who render

each his own, for such men think in harmony with themselves as well
as with each other, O1tOL ya'P ial EcT*
o[LOVooUOL
~A.Tg
ICOL &
(NE,
IX, vi, 3, 1167 b 5). That is,. each wishes his own as well as the othersi
good, which in every case is that he be, for his own sake, by way of
feeling and thinking.
In their unity, friends constitute what Kant would call a kingdom of ends (Grundlegungzur Metaphysik der Sitten *433-34, hereafter "Grundlegung, * "; normally, English translations indicate
corresponding pages in the same star edition). As the highest good of
man's own being, friendship is the good in itself, To' ica0'a&6' &yae0v,
der Zweck an sich selbst, of man's membership in a Reich der Zwecke.
Now what brings and holds together different friends in the unity of
their sameness, a oipspowra, is called the bond of their frienship.
Friendship binds, obliges. Thus, friends are those who owe obligation;
they do so to each other as well as to themselves. The obligatoriness
of our obligations is what unites us in the unity of our

ioVo La. The
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unifying power of that unity is the law of our friendship, that is, the
law of understanding, as the mode of togetherness of beings to whom
it is given to understand. In so binding us, it frees and allows us to be
who we are, and so calls upon us to fulfill the necessity of our most
essential possibility.
As the ever eluding, always already shining, and all-encompassing light of understanding, this law is the invisible and inviolable
sphere of the holy, the site of man's encounter and struggle with the
gods. As such a site, the law is man's 'Oog, the house in which he
dwells in the ouvjOsLa of friendship, and where, in the words of
Heraclitus, O'jeog &vOpC69 ato(v, man belongs with the gods
(Fragment 119, as translated by Heidegger in BrZH 45, Eng. 233).
Divine is the sight of the law, which mortal man is forever denied. To
that sight, the gods owe their divinity, so that the law is theirs also.
In the poet's words,
2I

Vo~Aog 6 3EavIov PacrtX8bg

Ova-rufv Te ca &Oavaov
aye-L 8LJabYoV T6 P=LcaXrLaLov
tsp-raiT

Xq L.

The law, king of all, mortals and immortals alike, exerts the supreme
force of 81cii with the highest hand (Pindar, Fragment 169). Seeing
its light, gods gather it, and strike man with those rare and sharp
flashes of illumination that clear his paths on the way to answer the
call of the law.
II. THEMIS
What then is the saying of law? How is law said, if indeed it
can be said at all? In the first place, what is it to say?
Saying accomplishes itself in the spoken word, but it is not the
same as speaking. Much, if not indeed most, speaking says nothing,
and only spits words out in mere babble. Only speech proper says.
Speech proper says what something is by letting the thing itself appear of itself as it is. "In speech (&'cpavoi~), insofar as speaking is
genuine, what is spoken must be drawn from that about which one
speaks, so that the spoken sharing with another, in what it says,
brings that about which it speaks in the open, and so makes it
accessible to the other" (Sein und Zeit, hereafter "SuZ' *32, the
English translation, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Being
and Time (Harper & Row, 1962), indicates corresponding pages in the
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same star edition). In English too, as in German and in Greek, the
word "to say," sagen, q~tt(, says the same as "to see." To say
something is to see it and let it be seen, i.e., to show it, to point it up
and let it show itself in the shining of its appearance to the knowing
eye. The French dire and its Latin and Greek ancestors, dicare,
dicere, 8smV4LL, in German zeigen, exhibit the same web of primordial

relations: "direquelque chose" signifies bringing something to light.
Accordingly, the saying of law, juris dictio, 8(Kr1, is the
showing of law. Now the question arises, grammatically speaking,
whether, in this "showing of law," 'law" operates as the subject or the
object of its "showing." If the volog reigns as the all-encompassing,
always already shining light within which all seeing, showing, and
coming to appearance of beings take place, if the v4Log itself "is"
therefore no being, it can never come into view. In letting beings be
seen, the law must withdraw from sight, and hence deny itself to
saying. As the nihil originarium, invisible and inviolable, &I
nTO tsvov xal &E. &nopou'gvov, forever sought and forever eluding
(Aristotle, Metaphysics, hereafter Met., VII, i, 7, 1028 b 3), the law of
understanding remains essentially unsayable. That which allows
every seeing never allows itself to be said. Law must remain the
enigma, all speaking of which is in riddle.
In no saying of law does law ever let itself be said, but in every
saying the law itself says. The law shows, frees, and allows all beings
to be seen. Every speaking that says, i.e., speaking proper, rests at
bottom upon a saying of law. Saying indeed belongs to the essence of
law. Saying is not something the law does in addition to and after its
illumination of world, either supervening or serving the law as a
means of fixing or communicating its revelation. Saying, as showing
and letting see, is that in and through which understanding first happens, and so brings beings to light. The v4Log allows in that it says.
Only because the law has first already said and let see, can the
human sounding of words point up, bedeuten, and show what so is
allowed to appear. Every speaking that says speaks what it already
"has" to say. It has what it has because it has been so given to say by
the saying of law. In its own pointing, the spoken word answers, antwortet, ent-spricht, a prior saying of the law. The speaking that says
does so always in response to a call of the votog, der weisende Brauch,
the calling of which recalls man to his essential destiny. Only as such
a response is it spoken in truth.
In that it answers the law and so says, speaking is also sharing, com-munire, mit-teilen. Shared in that sharing is the presence of
what is said and lets itself be seen in the light of understanding. In
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this sharing, the letting see of the speaking that says fulfills itself in
the hearing and looking that lets appear what has been said. The
unity of this belonging together in seeing with one another is called in
German das Gesprdch, the gathering and completion of speaking, in
Greek &Lx5tg,in French and English, the conversation, that is, the
turning together toward what is shared in saying. Das Gesprdch, as
the sharing of words and thoughts, -roo' oLVO0VV 6yCov Kal 8,avo'La
(NE,IX, ix, 10, 1170 b 10), is the essence of friendship as the mode of
togetherness, das Mitsein, proper to men. The essential grace that
friends share in speaking, the munus of their communio, is the gift of
understanding, the world as the tree of graces. Hence, the call of
friendship is nothing other than the call of the law to which speaking
answers insofar as it says.
Now if a speaking that says always answers a call of the law, it
must have its ground in a hearing of that call. Hearing in turn occurs
only out of the attunement of listening. Therefore, man is able to say
only insofar as he first obeys, ob-audit, the law of understanding.
Hence, the most essential action open to man, that in which he may
rise to the necessity of his essential destiny, is the act of obedience to
law.
However, no call can be heard unless of itself it first lets itself
be heard. Here again we seem to run up against paradox, for the law,
we have said, "is" the essential nothing that never lets itself be said,
because in letting appear it effaces itself behind the beings it allows to
appear; but now we say that, nonetheless, it must be able to let its
call be heard. How can the invisible and unsayable law sound a call
that man can hear? Or, to ask in Hegel's manner, how can there be
anything like a revelation of the law, an actualization of the napoucoa
of Spirit? For any actual word or sign to come within the reach of
man's hearing, the opening of the openness of understanding must
already have taken place. But the wonder of wonders that demands
here to be thought is precisely the gift of that openness, within which
alone any encounter between men and gods is possible at all.
Invisible and unsayable, the law is, and must be, silent. And
yet it says. Indeed the law says precisely in that it keeps silent.
Silence itself says. Silence does not consist in a mere absence of
sounding words. The essence of silence rather shows itself in the
silencing of the silence of recollection, in which the possibility of
saying first opens its wonder and stuns the thinking man. The silencing of recollection itself is the disclosure of the essential nothing out of
which the being of beings is given to thought. The necessity of this
silencing is the call in which the law first lets itself be heard. The
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necessity that calls in the silence of recollection is the call to obedience. How does it take place?
The necessity of silence is heard ever so dimly in the negative
mode of the law's own denying itself to saying. Like Sisyphus, the
man who tried to steal the secret of the gods, we are forever condemned to the frustration of our striving to grasp, define, and master
the essence of law. Wittgenstein heard this denying call of silence:
All that we wish to say can a priori only be nonsense. Nevertheless, we run
against the limits of language.... This running against the limits of language
is ethics. I hold it truly important that one put an end to all the idle talk about
ethics-whether there be knowledge, whether there be values, whether the
good let itself be defined, etc. In ethics one is always making the attempt to
say something that does not touch the essence of the matter and can never
touch it ("Zu Heidegger" in Friedrich Waismann, ed., Wittgenstein und der
Wiener Kreis 68-69).

All speaking that purports to say the unsayable degrades itself to
irreverent chatter.
Most originally, however, the call of silence is das Geldut der
Stille, the sounding of stillness (UZS 30; Poetry, Language, Thought
207; UZS 262, Eng. 131), which is heard ringing in the law's own
affirmation of itself in the actual saying of law. Every speaking that
says proceeds from within the unsayable saying of law, and is itself a
work of law, in the original sense of 'pyov, Werk, in Latin opus. The
work of law is not the law. What it says, and the speaking that says
it are beings that shine within and from the illumination of law. But
there opens for thought the possibility that the work, in its own
shining appearance as a work of law, might somehow bring into
presence the law that is at work in it, so that the law itself would
somehow, however still disguised, come to its own place within the
open of its light.
The Ancients never doubted the truth of this possibility. The
radiance of law, -ro &ya06v, in the appearance of its work, tb 9pyov, is
called in Greek ' Ka v, a word for which our own word "beauty,"
worn and impoverished by centuries of aesthetics, no longer provides
a translation. Plato explains TO' K&X og as that which alone has the
the most, v;Uv s
shines the most and enraptures
destiny of being what
'
/¢a~o
-rav

CK

wovov

vaL

aL

ipaagivJ atov (Phaedrus,250 d 5). It transports man into the divine

madness that estranges him from what ordinarily passes for
conformity to law, riiv & [[tavwav]U{tr Odag akkaig tdiv doO&wv
vogtdWRv yLyvop[WsvlV (id., 265 a 10). The KaXXog in the work of law is

what commands admiration, quod mirandum est, and so silences all
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ordinary talk, and transports man into the reverence of recollection,
where the law claims his obedience. So is it, as Aristotle explained,
that the kindness of friendship does not remain &pyog, workless, but
in time, as the friends dwell together, comes into being in the shining
tLg t"LTOLOUtOV
presence of the admirable, yUVaTL &rav -ro qavi iKag
(NE,IX, v, 3-4, 1167 a 10-20). And so is it also first and foremost that
the gift of understanding comes to shine in its sensible ipyov (NE, IX,
ix, 9, 1170 a 30-35).
The power and mystery of the name Heidegger gave to the law
lies in that it says at once what is at work in the work of law, namely
the law as law, and the coming to work of the law in its work. By its
ambiguity, das Ereignis points to the shining of the unsayable in the
saying of law. In the work of law, the law itself as the Ereignis that
allows every being what is its own, das Eigene, happens as das Erdugnen, the coming to the eyes of the gift of understanding. What
brings about the happening of this event? The law is
never the effect of a cause, nor the consequence of a ground.... The law itself
brings itself to show itself-and nothing outside it. Das Ereignende ist das
Ereignis selbst-und nichts auflerdem.... There is nothing else to which it
leads back, out of which it could be explained. It is no result, Ergebnis, of anything else, but the primordial gift, die Ur-gebnis, the giving of which first
grants the like of a 'there is,' 'es gibt,' which even 'being,' 'das Sein,' needs in
order to reach into its own as presence (UZS 258, Eng. 127).

To law as law, there belongs that it be obeyed in the work of law. In
so showing itself, the law happens as this law: the opening of this
world, the gift of this friendship, the handing over of this legacy, the

destination of this way of saying, which we so poorly call our
"language." To this law, law calls man to belong in obedience, and so
allows him to surrender to his own possibility.
The saying of law in which law comes to work is the speaking
that says the deed of understanding. Such speaking is so spoken that
out of its own piety and reserve it lets the unsayable shine through its
union of the spoken to the unspoken. In the humility of its own pointing to the unspoken, the spoken word lets the deed show itself as
understanding at work, that is: as the happening of the mystery of
unconcealment, the striving of the strife of light and night, the springing of truth out of untruth, the opening of world on earth. Through
the keenness of its union of the spoken and the unspoken, which lets
the deed shine as work, the word allows the deed its poignant presence, and so commands admiration, hinting at the unsayable wonder
of law at work in its work.
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In such saying, the work of law rises to stand out and rest in
the open of world. The stillness of its standing presence moves and
arrests the run of mundane affairs, quieting the noise of common talk,
and transporting man in the silence of recollection, that he may wonder in awe. The work itself strikes man with awe, and so opens the
world in which it stands. This awe, in German die Achtung, long ago
thought by Kant as "the feeling of reason, das Gefiihl der Vernunft," is
the attunement of essential obedience, in which alone man first hears
the call of the law (compare Kant, Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft
*126-59; normally translations indicate corresponding pages in the
same star edition; and Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der
Phinomenologie §§ 13-14 (Klostermann, 1975); the English translation, Albert Hofstadter, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology
(Indiana U., 1975), follows the original numbering of paragraphs; and
WlD 124-25, Eng. 203-04).
In the happening of its work, the law instates itself in a historical world, diese geschichtliche Welt, as the opening and the destination, das Geschick, of this world. The work itself is the stating that
stands, but what shines through this standing is the glory of law at
work in its work. In stating and so standing, the work erects the law
in the world it opens. Why is the law, das Recht, so erected, errichtet
and eingerichtet?
Because its dignity, Widrde, so demands
(Gelassenheit 60-71 (Neske, 1959), translated in John M. Anderson
and E. Hans Freund, Discourse on Thinking 81-90 (Harper & Row,
1966); compare Kant, Grundlegung *434-36). Just as the erection of
the temple obeys the god in letting him approach man and stay
present in his house, so the erection of the work obeys the law in
letting it have the standing that accords with its standing above and
over all beings as the spring of their being. So erected, the v6jog that
allows is 04ug, the Steadfast One, das Gesetz, in Latin fas, the
goddess who tells men their fate and presides over all gatherings of
the gods.
Because the voog in its work is 04[g, the saying of law is
called in Greek vogoftota. We are misled when we hear the %Okug of
the -CLOe'vaL of OE'Lg, the original Setzung of Gesetz, as referring to the
human act of setting, putting, placing, or indeed to the self-assertion
of a will to impose. Even the Latin ponere has the root sense of letting
something stand at rest in the open, which may explain its later
blending with pausare, to halt and pause, in the French poser and
thus the English "to pose." The 0Oekt of 04at is no positing of some
"thesis," but the celebration of the radiance of law in the erection of
its work (UKW 32-33, 49, 67-72, Eng. 43-44, 61, 82-87). The Latin
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word for it is institutio, the German Errichtung. Our own "statute" is
originally the statutum of the statuere of such an institution. "Errichten sagt: Offnen das Rechte im Sinne des entlang weisenden
Masses, als welches das Wesenhafte die Weisungen gibt. Erecting
says: opening the right in the sense of the directive measure as which
the essential gives directions" (UKW 33, Eng. 44). Only because the
law is and must be erected, can it also rule, i.e., direct and correct in
the sense of pointing and righting, straightening the paths of man, in
Greek op6ov. As this guiding of man on the way to his essential
destiny, the law erected in its work, das Gesetz, is the founding of
right, das Recht, le droit. (On the sense of such a founding, see UKW
62-64, Eng. 75-77; compare Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral,
second essay, section 11).
III. LOGOS
In the saying of law, the law that stands fast in the inscrutable
glory of its work, and so rules over man, and allows all beings what is
their own, comes to spoken word. The work of law is indeed, in its
most original sense, the word, in Greek X6 yog, traceable to the same
ancient root as the Latin lex, the French loi, the German Lage, and
the English "law." The Greek verb kySLV, like its relatives legere and
legen, says also: to gather and lay out, and thus let lie in full sight
(SuZ *32-34; WHD 120-25, Eng. 198-209; Vortrdge und Aufsdtze 199221 (Neske, 1954), translated in part in David Farrell Krell and Frank
A. Capuzzi, Early Greek Thinking 59-78 (Harper & Row, 1975)). The
word says, that is, shows precisely because it poses what it says in the
open. In this posing, it lets the work of law, as noble deed, stand in
its splendor and receive its lauding. The X5yog is the original Ohg in
which the votog is first erected as ruling right.
As work of law, the word itself is the Ereignis in which the
invisible law comes to work in the visible deed. In the speaking of the
word, therefore, reigns the unity of a difference, the twofold: of the
said and the unsayable that shines through the union of the said with
its unsaid; of the deed and the law at work in the deed; of thing and
world. Properly spoken, every word harbors an essential ambiguity.
It carries out the inter-section, in German der Unter-schied, of the
difference that draws apart the unity by which a being, das Seiende
(the said, the deed, the thing) and its being, das Sein des Seienden
(the unsayable, the law, the world) are bound in their mutual belonging. This drawing apart, the Austrag of the &acpopi, is the essence of
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pain, the distressing movement of which points to the word's origin in
the holy, as the latter withdraws into the unknowability that protects
its inviolability. In the unity of this tension lies the source of the
stunning radiance,
ic4 xov, of law at work in its work, that with
which Kant struggled in his treatment of the "reflecting judgment"
(Kritik der Urteilskraft §§ 6-18; translations of the Critique of
Judgment normally use the same numbering of paragraphs as the
original). Above all in poetry, the power of which reached still
unsurpassed heights in the Ancient Greek tragedy, the singing word
arrests man, wrests him from his attachments to the beings that
surround him in ordinary existence, and transports him into the
presence of the law out of which their being is granted.
Even at its highest, however, for the word of law to be such a
work, its truth, die Wahrheit, must be received, and for it to remain
what it is, its truth once received must be kept in trust, die
Bewahrung der Wahrheit (UKW 54, Eng. 66). A work can be work
only insofar and so long as the arresting power of its word is heard,
that is, only insofar and as long as men listen and let the work be the
work it is. What then is it to hear and keep the word of law? A work
is no ordinary being the possession of which can somehow be secured,
and the substance of which may then be kept in store and preserved.
No keeping of the law has yet occurred when the spoken words are
fixed in memory, recorded in writing, represented in beliefs, or even
when their represented prescriptions are reproduced in conformable
conduct. The law, whose word is to be kept, never lies in the actuality
or preservation of some prescribed state of affairs. It never "is" anything other than the opening to men of their essential possibility, i.e.,
the gift of a possible friendship in understanding. The word of law is
work only as the coming into presence in a being, namely the spoken
word, of the unsayable truth of that possibility. Never can it be captured in anything like the proposition of rules, principles, theories,
interpretations, etc. Any attempt to do so would produce only sterile
dogma. To keep the word of law is to stay in awe within the truth of
an advent, namely the advent of the gift of understanding.
However, it belongs to the law that its word is not kept. Men
will not stay within the truth of the law. Men live for the most part in
diversion, absorbed in the occupations and preoccupations of daily
existence, turned away from their essential destiny. The thought of
such a turn away from the light of truth goes back through Plato's
account of the philosopher's "turn," the 3t8pLay ' (Republic,VII, 514),
to the teachings with which Parmenides returned from his encounter
with the goddess of Truth (Fragment 6). Pascal called it diversion, le
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divertissement (Pensges, 132-39 [Brunschwicg, 170, 168, 169, 469, 139,
142, 166, 143]). Heidegger speaks of it as the fallenness of man, die
Verfallenheit (SuZ 175). The fall of man is in no way to be thought as
the succumbing of the animal rationale to the temptations of his
animal "nature" out of weakness of will in breach of the rules of
"reason." Fallen man has rather fallen prey to all "reasonable"
expectations of ordinary common sense, even as he violates them.
Fallenness reigns in conformity and transgression alike. Nor does the
fall consist in or result from any wilfull self-assertion in defiance of
the law. The ways of human self-assertion to which it leads proceed
always from oblivion, not defiance, of the law.
The fall is no disobedience or wrongdoing at all, but rather an
escape from essential obedience, which dulls the power to do wrong as
much as the ability to do right. At bottom it is no doing of man's will
at all, but rather a bewildering way in which the law itself is at work.
The law itself grants man the sight of the beings that surround him
and capture his attention. The law itself effaces itself from the sight
it grants. The law itself allows beings to distract man from its veiled
presence in the work of law. There happens a kind of bewitchment of
man by the fascination of the beings he sees, touches, grasps, and
takes in his possession. The opportunities and necessities of daily
existence press their demands with such urgency that they drown the
silent call of the highest necessity. Beings in the actuality of their
uses and dangers overcrowd the open of thought and suppress the
memory of the useless nothing out of which their being is granted.
The familiar acquaintance in and with which man secures his relations to beings comes to pass for the standard measure of knowledge.
The fall also alters man's relation to the word. Language itself, which in truth "is" no being, falls in use and degenerates into
thing-words, sounds of the voice, or marks of pen or print, that serve
as means of processing and communicating "information," thingthoughts, the usability of which is secured by the ordinary "meanings"
of a common vocabulary. The word comes to stand for what the being
it says ordinarily holds in common with others of the same kind, i.e.,
for the commonplace. Thus, language comes to rule as the repository
of clich6s, das Man (SuZ 126). There arises the illusion that the word
of law is preserved when its pronouncements are spelled out in proposed rules and doctrines, available for convenient repetition and
managed enforcement. "Law" turns into a public orthodoxy, whose
parroting and sophistry 'justifies" a noisy, quarrelsome vindication of
thing-rights. No justum facere, no jus, no invocation of the gods, can
ever take place in a lex so debased. However much conformity may be
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extracted in its name, all arrangements it supports bear the mark of
lawlessness (compare Pascal, Les Provinciales, usually translated as
The Provincial Letters, passim). All attempts to shore up such
"laws"--by grounding them in God's commands, or in "laws of nature,"
or in transcendental canons of "reason," or "critical morality"--must
fall flat on their face, not for want of logic or cleverness of some sort,
but because they themselves proceed from the oblivion of law in which
the order they would ground has fallen.
Today, we suffer the nearing of such a near oblivion of law.
Our age is that in which a fallen humanity claims for itself the position of the all-founding subject of philosophy, the "god" to whom even
law counts as nothing other than an object of his making. The creation of the creative will of this subject is called "positive law," now
understood, or rather misunderstood, in the modern sense of a product of the human act of posing and imposing. For this new formation
of law, das Ge-setz, Heidegger coins a new name, das Ge-stell, a word
that had never born such a signification in ordinary German (Die
Technik und die Kehre 19 (Neske, 1962), translated in William Lovitt,
The Question Concerning Technology, hereafter Eng., 19 (Harper &
Row, 1977). In claiming the power of universal legislator, fallen man
fancies he has overcome his finitude, risen above all beings as their
enlightened master and protector, free from the shackles of faith,
tradition, and soon even death. Under the spell of this "positive law,"
thought decays into the ratio of rational calculation, which sets itself
as the measure of all knowledge and wisdom. The "legal" becomes
identical with the rational. Philosophy too falls in the service of the
methodical rationalization of all spheres of thought, and makes
language into a system of symbols fit for the smooth functioning of
calculators. "Rules" and their unruly words give way to the calculable
formulas of "policy." All beings, including man, are reduced to the
standing of a mere asset, der Bestand (id. at 16, Eng. 17), priced
quantities of disposable energy. The superstitious pursuit of the
"realization of values" enthrones itself as the highest enlightenment
of liberated humanity.
Yet even in this nearing of the oblivion of law lurks the presence of a sign of the law. There reigns amidst the wealth of values a
strange absence of the good. Values devalue themselves in the debasement of their own appraising and pricing, so that an eerie devastation follows the progress of man's conquest of the earth. The endless restlessness of his pursuits oppresses man like an everpresent
ghost of his unfulffllment.
The deafening bombardment of
"communication" destroys the silence of listening, and confines men to
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senseless isolation. The busy, all-intrusive making and remaking of
"policy" denies its own "decisions" all power of direction. The dulling
glare of sensation robs the eyes of the sight in which beauty might
appear.
When man revolts against his desolation, or takes it as a challenge to his creative will, he only sinks to greater depths of the same.
Every posing of the "problem" of modern man as an object of reflection
and purposive action further entangles man in that very mode of
thinking and being out of which the "problem" first arises. No exertion of will can ever accomplish an "overcoming of nihilism," for the
rationality of rational man is itself no achievement of his will, but an
astounding work of the law. The law itself allows beings to approach
man as possible objects of his knowing and willing. The same law
saves itself from the reach of this will by denying itself to the sight of
man. By this very absence it allows the nearing of its own oblivion.
Wo aberGefahr ist, wdchst
Das Rettende auch.
But where danger is, grows what saves also (H6lderlin,
Patmos, quoted in id. at 41, Eng. 42). The law also may allow
thinking to experience the danger of nearing oblivion. In so allowing
it may save itself from the fulfillment of its oblivion, for oblivion can
fulfill itself only in the forgetting of its own forgetting. If and insofar
as thinking may experience the nearing oblivion, the law may return
to thought in the mode of its own absence. Absence too, as the want
of a presence, is a mode of coming to presence. Just as in feeling the
absence of a friend, we remember the gift of this friendship, and even
in pain can be thankful for it, so in the absence of law, thinking may
return to the law in the way of remembrance and thank. The pain of
its devastating absence may itself be the silent call in which the law
lets man hear of its need of man. Then the devastation itself may
turn into saving grace, provided man will for his own part accept it,
and so turn and be healed:
The imposition of positive law, das Bestellen des Gestells, poses itself, stellt sich, before the thing, leaves it as thing without the protection of its trustee,
truthless. Thus positive law misplaces, verstelit, and hides the nearness of the
world nearing in the thing. Positive law misplaces even its misplacing, just as

the forgetting of something forgets itself and draws itself away in the wake of
forgottenness. The law, das Ereignis, of forgottenness not only lets fall in concealnent, but this falling itself falls along in concealment, which itself also
falls away with the falling.
And yet-in all misplacing of positive law there lights itself the world's
glance of light, there flashes the truth of being. That is, if and when positive
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"law" lights itself in its reigning essence as the danger, namely the saving one.
In positive law too, as a reigning destiny of being, reigns the essence of the
light of a lightning flash of being. Positive law is, albeit veiled, still a glance,
not a blind destiny in the sense of a fully fatal fate (id. at 44-45, Eng. 46-47).

The saying of law comes to word in its own ways. No willing
ever brings it about. We may prepare ourselves to hear it, if we let
ourselves experience and think through the oblivion of law that
threatens the essence of man in the age of positive law, das Gestell.
To do so is not to ponder the miseries of modern man. Nor is it to
deny, or refuse, or otherwise measure and control the powers of modem technique, such as they are. The task of thinking is at once far
simpler and far more demanding. It is to let the reign of positive law
be what it is. That is to say: thinking must learn to see the essence
of positive law as a work of law. In so learning, we should already
have begun to answer the call of the law.

Heidegger's thinking settles no question. No thinking proper
ever does. Thinking proper only lets essential questions pose
themselves more sharply. Only so may it prepare us to experience the
wonder that "das Ereignis ereignet" (Zur Sache des Denkens 24 (Max
Niemeyer, 1976), translated in Joan Stambaugh, On Time and Being,
hereafter Eng., 24 (Harper & Row, 1972)). One obstacle on our way to
such experience is "the saying of law in the way of articles and
lectures. These can speak only in propositions" (id. at 25, Eng. 24).
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